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Abstract: A growing non-legal scholarship explores the domestic implementation
of international court judgments in national law and policy. Yet little attention has
been paid to the indirect effects of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case
law: namely, the ways in which its judgments may raise public consciousness,
change how social actors articulate their claims, and/or prompt mobilization
among civil society actors. This paper conceptualizes the significance of the
indirect effects of ECtHR judgments in the domain of religion and education.
Drawing on a constitutive approach to the law it explains the potential impact of
such indirect effects. Second, it presents analytical concepts such as legal
mobilization, which underpin the country-based case studies included in this
symposium. Third, it provides an overview of the ECtHR religion and
education-related case law which sets the stage for examining the nature and
effects of the shadow of that case law in different country contexts.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the 1990s, the European Court of Human Rights (hereby ECtHR, or
the Court) has become a central site where increasingly complex issues
regarding religious freedom and diversity are contested. Before this
court, local and national minority and majority faith communities, as
well as NGOs of religious, non-religious, and other persuasions, have
invoked human rights principles to challenge how European states
approach and manage religious diversity. In response to a large number
of petitions in the religious field,1 the ECtHR has pronounced authoritative
and occasionally landmark judgments that state-parties to the European
Convention of Human Rights (hereby ECHR or the Convention) have an
obligation to implement domestically. Controversies related to religious
symbols in public spaces (whether worn, as the headscarf, or on the
wall, as in the crucifix), the teaching of religious education in public
schools, or bioethics and social ethics such as the right to same-sex mar-
riage, are all issues which touch upon deeply held religious beliefs and
which have arisen before the ECtHR. In the context of such cases, the
Court has been addressing some of the most divisive and emotive issues
facing European societies. Do ECtHR judgemnts make a difference
when it comes to religious pluralism on the ground?
The ECtHR’s pronouncement of authoritative judgments in a variety of
areas that encompass how states define and manage religious freedom and
diversity exemplifies a global phenomenon in terms of the rise of interna-
tional courts. One of the roles that these courts perform resembles that of
constitutional courts in their scope and aim (Alter 2014, 16). In their de
facto constitutional review role, courts like the ECtHR scrutinize national
laws, policies, and practices for conformity with human rights principles.2
While a growing non-legal scholarship has begun to explore the domestic
implementation of international court judgments in national law and
policy (Keller and Stone Sweet 2008; Hillebrecht 2012; Anagnostou
2013; Anagnostou and Psychogiopoulou 2013), virtually no attention
has been paid to their indirect effects3. Yet, the indirect effects of interna-
tional human rights rulings are arguably far more important than the direct
impact that they can have by means of their formal implementation by
state authorities (Galanter 1983; Cassel 2001, 122; McCann 2004).
Indirect effects include the ways in which international human rights
judgments may influence domestic debates in law, politics, and academia.
They may raise public consciousness, change how social actors perceive
and articulate their grievances and claims, empower national rights
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institutions, or prompt mobilization among civil society and other rights
advocates. For example, studies show that decisions of high profile and
authoritative courts like the U.S. Supreme Court prompt individuals to
clearly elaborate their attitudes on an issue, crystallizing their views for
or against the ruling and triggering a broad range of mobilization efforts
(Johnson and Martin 1998). Alluding—at least in part—to the variable
indirect effects of judicial rulings, some authors claim that the ECtHR
in tandem with national constitutional courts play a significant role in
redefining religious freedom in Europe (Richardson and Lee 2014, 292;
see also Fokas 2015; Richardson 2015).
Specifically, in the domain of religion, a sizeable legal scholarship has
explored the evolution of the ECtHR religion-related case law, its jurispru-
dential content and legal argumentation (See Evans 2001; Evans and
Thomas 2006; Evans 2008; Mancini 2010; Ringelheim 2012; 2014).
But there has been hardly any scholarly attention to the social and legal
activism that emerges in response or in reaction to the ECtHR judgments
around religion, as well as to a broader array of indirect effects that
they may have in domestic struggles around religion. While the North
American socio-legal literature serves as an excellent resource and inspi-
ration, there are certainly significant challenges to grafting the relevant
theories onto the European context. There are fundamental differences
between the European and U.S. contexts, having to do with relative
degrees of litigiousness, of embeddedness of religion in society and in
politics, and of the visibility and popular awareness of the main courts
in question (the U.S. Supreme Court, in most of the relevant North
American literature, and the ECtHR)4.
The primary purpose of this paper is to provide the conceptual and ana-
lytical frame for the study of the indirect effects of European human rights
judgments in connection with religion and education, paving the way for
the application of the primarily North American relevant socio-legal
scholarship in the European context. The first part of this paper discusses
the significance of the indirect effects of courts by drawing from a consti-
tutive approach to law and rights. The second section defines and dis-
cusses basic analytical concepts, such as legal mobilization, which is
the focus of the country-based case studies included in this symposium.
And the third section provides a brief overview of the religion-related
case law of the ECtHR specifically in reference to religion and education,
thus setting the stage for the articles to follow in this symposium, which
examines the nature and effects of the shadow of the religion and
education-related case law presented here.
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Religion5 and education form a particularly fruitful focus for the study
of the Court’s indirect effects. First, as noted by Fokas in this volume,
“religion and education” represents a rapidly broadening domain of
issues which touch on national as well as individual and family sensitiv-
ities: the domain goes well beyond the teaching, or not, of religion in
schools (including the nature of such courses and the possibility of and
conditions for exemption) and includes the way religion is taught in
history courses, religious arguments against the teaching of sex education
or evolution, and the presence of religious symbols in schools (whether
worn by students or instructors or displayed in the schools). Thus, religion
and education entail the subject of societal and political debates which are
increasing in number and intensifying in effect at the local, national and
international level.
Throughout Europe we see contention—often played out in legal set-
tings—over whether religious schools can receive state funding, the indoc-
trinating character of courses on religious education, the demand for
inclusion of atheist perspectives as part of public school curricula, just
to name a few. Meanwhile, this is an area where the tension between
the national and transnational levels is especially acute: considered a fun-
damental aspect of culture and identity, religion is a first candidate for
falling within the realm of what should be addressed at the lowest level
of governance (subsidiarity) and of what deserves an especially wide
“margin of appreciation” within the ECtHR context. In the context of
such heightened tension between the national and European level in this
area, the indirect effects of the related case law can be expected to be
both broad-ranging and highly consequential.
The existing knowledge gap about the indirect effects of international
human rights rulings limits our understanding of the actual effects these
rulings have on the ground. The set of country-based case studies, for
which this paper provides a theoretical and conceptual framework, high-
light the variable potential of the ECtHR judgments to reach and influence
the local and national communities that are most centrally concerned.
By developing a research agenda to study the indirect effects of the
ECtHR judgments, they make a contribution to our knowledge of the
Strasbourg judiciary. They also advance the state of research on interna-
tional courts more broadly, illuminating the role of such courts and their
potential to influence domestic politics and societies.
Understanding the indirect effects of international courts has become
imperative at a time when both interest in, but also skepticism about
these courts has grown, more in Europe than anywhere else. As a recent
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study shows the salience of European courts, the Court of Justice of the
European Union (hereby CJEU) and the ECtHR, has grown for the citi-
zens of Europe. The publics’ knowledge of and interest in European
courts is possibly closely linked to the substantial levels of legitimacy
and trust these courts enjoy. Such legitimacy and trust though is likely
to vary across countries and to fluctuate in response to unpopular decisions
(Voeten 2013; see also Benvenisti 1999; Mancini 2010). The political
debates around the potential UK withdrawal from the European
Convention on Human Rights pose one conspicuous example. Of
broader relevance to the Convention system as a whole is the reform
process the Court has been undergoing in recent years, resulting in,
amongst other things, a greater emphasis on the principles of subsidiarity
and the margin of appreciation.
THE INDIRECT EFFECTS OF COURTS: DECENTERING LAW
AND RIGHTS
How do we understand the indirect effects of courts and why are they
significant? An appreciation of courts’ indirect effects has grown out
of the documented limitations of court rulings in ordering or enforcing
significant legal and policy change. Within the context of a well-
developed American legal scholarship on this issue, scholars have thor-
oughly questioned the ability of court decisions to bring actual social
and policy change on the ground in line with pronounced judicial
norms (Rosenberg 1991). Even when they vindicate those pursuing pro-
gressive social change, court decisions arguably mete out little more
than “hollow hope”: they can promote significant legal and social
change only when there is ample support from legislative and executive
officials, as well as significant elite and public support for their rulings
(Rosenberg 1991). As Malcolm Feeley puts it, “the conventional
wisdom among political scientists and sociologists who have studied
these matters is that the courts by themselves are not very powerful and,
at best, are important at the margins or in conjunction with other govern-
mental bodies” (Feeley 1992, 751). The message one gleans is that courts
are not always “where it’s at’: we need a closer look at the margins, and at
local and national level developments on matters of religious pluralism
(McCann” 1992).6
Existing studies show that the domestic policy effects of judgments
issued by the ECtHR in the area of religious freedom vary and are
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often limited. In Greece for example, the ECtHR judgments that vindi-
cated religious freedom claims raised by Jehovah’s Witnesses (JWs)
offered a justification for liberalizing administrative practice and national
jurisprudence in the direction of expanding the religious freedom
enjoyed by this minority. In the absence of sufficient, domestic political
and majority (Orthodox) church support though, they had limited
impact on the underlying and restrictive legal frame (Anagnostou and
Psychogiopoulou 2013)7. A normative implication underlying the “con-
strained” view of courts is that as institutions they are on the side of the
powers that be, providing support for the status quo but being weak
sources for challenging the prevailing order (McCann 2004, 507).
A decentred perspective of law and rights, however, moves away from a
focus on a court’s ruling ordering policy change, to explore how interested
actors view a judicial decision, decipher, and enact its perceived messages.
In this tradition of socio-legal analysis, the law is viewed as a cultural
institution that forms and transforms via the meanings that people attach
to it. Through this lens, law and rights are primarily understood as discur-
sive logics that shape the normative frames through which individual and
collective actors conceptualize and seek to address social problems
(McCann 1994).8
In an early formulation of the constitutive perspective of law and rights,
Marc Galanter’s seminal contribution referred to “the radiating effects of
courts” (Galanter 1983). Galanter proposed a consideration of the centrifugal
flow of influence outward from courts and into the wider world (Galanter
1983, 119). From this perspective, the principal contribution of courts to
dispute resolution is the provision of a background of norms and procedures
against which negotiations and regulation take place in both private and
governmental settings (Galanter 1983, 121): “Courts produce not only
decisions, but messages. These messages are resources that parties use in
envisioning, devising, pursuing, negotiating, vindicating claims (and in
avoiding, defending, and defeating them)” (Galanter 1983, 126).
Other scholars have explored the indirect effects of law and courts spe-
cifically in terms of developing a “politics of rights” (Scheingold 2004).
A politics of rights develops, for example, when marginalized groups
capitalize on perceptions of entitlement associated with particular legal
norms in order to initiate social mobilization. While they are neither nec-
essary nor indispensable resources for social movement activism, from
this perspective law and rights can potentially transform the tactical land-
scape in which such activism develops, as well as raise awareness and
empower social actors.
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In sum, legal norms and judicial rulings may have various less conspic-
uous but nonetheless important constitutive effects well beyond policy
change: they can alter both the context of social struggles, as well as
the strategies and identities of social actors. Court decisions can recast
the contours of public debates on an issue by imparting legitimacy on
or enhancing the salience of particular kinds of rights claims. They can
influence the discursive frames of social movement actors, reconstruct
their interests, and at times empower them. At the same time, they can
provoke reactionary mobilization to curtail rights’ advancements, as has
often been the case in legal action related to religion and religious
freedom. In these variable and contradictory ways, courts can contribute
to the emergence, growth or decline of social movements, not only of pro-
gressive but also of conservative ones (McCann 2006). Such largely unin-
tended and often contradictory indirect effects are among the least studied
aspects of law and social change.
In the “shadow” of ECtHR religious freedoms cases, judicial enuncia-
tions of human rights supply standards and the setting for negotiations and
conflicts among the multiplicity of religious, social and state actors active
in the field of religion. The nature, extent, and results of the dynamics that
emerge are critical to an understanding of the fuller impact of the Court on
religious pluralism, which cannot be limitedly focused on implementation
or non-implementation of its decisions. As set out in the introduction to
this symposium (Fokas), a research agenda on the indirect effects of the
ECtHR religion and education judgments raises the following questions:
Do different social and religious actors in European states know and
pay attention to relevant ECtHR judgments, and how do they perceive
them? What kinds of legal, political, and social strategies do they
employ, and do their strategies change in response to ECtHR’s judgments?
Do secularist actors invoke ECtHR case law in their domestic struggles
and public discourse around religion and education, and if yes, in what
ways do they do so? Last but not least, how do dominant religious
actors perceive ECtHR judgments and how do they incorporate their
message in framing their views in domestic conflicts around religion
and education—if they do at all? Answers to such questions will impart
valuable insight into the radiating indirect effects of the Court’s case
law, and thus also on the Court’s impact, or lack thereof (as the case
may be) on religious pluralism at the grassroots level. It is the collective
aim of the four articles of country-based case studies completing this sym-
posium to address these questions.
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COURT DECISIONS, LEGAL MOBILIZATION AND THE
POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
ECtHR judgments are authoritative pronouncements of human rights law
that define the various manifestations, (shifting) content, and limits of reli-
gious freedom and conscience alongside other related rights. As such, they
can influence and contribute “by way of a politics of [human] rights” to
the emergence or success of a secularist or pluralist movement. A “politics
of rights” in Scheingold’s classical formulation, develops in the context of
campaigns that deploy rights in pursuit of a progressive political agenda,
including in regard to religious freedom. Religious freedom norms pro-
nounced in the ECtHR judgments, alongside other human rights, includ-
ing education and non-discrimination, can be deployed as both discursive
and institutional resources. They can help legitimate claims that are raised
by different social, legal, political and religious actors in a country and
shape their expectations as to the kinds of laws and policies a state
ought to adopt in order to ensure religious freedom. Under certain condi-
tions, a politics of human rights can be conducive to the successful attain-
ment of progressive goals at the national or transnational level. In the
paragraphs that follow we set out the potential indirect effects of
ECtHR case law, thus setting the stage for the empirical research presented
in the remaining contributions to this symposium. The empirical country-
based articles explore the extent to and conditions under which this poten-
tial is actually achieved at the grassroots level.
What kind of inspiration, awareness, and motivation can ECtHR judg-
ments provide to domestic actors pursuing a secular and pluralist kind of
teaching of and about religion in school? The research presented in the
articles which follow shows that human rights judgments in some cases
influence the mobilization strategies of such actors first by prompting
them to engage with law and pursue legal action in national or
European courts. In this regard, legal mobilization refers to the invocation
of legal rules and conventions (such as rights, constitutional provisions),
both substantive and procedural, by an individual or collective actors in
courts and in quasi-judicial bodies (i.e. ombudsman institutions). By liti-
gating in court, different actors seek to gain access to various goods, to
pressure for change in legal or policy change, and more broadly to regu-
late, order, legitimate or delimit relations between citizens and the State, as
well as relationships between private parties. A large and diverse scholar-
ship shows the benefits and the disadvantages of litigation as a form
of strategic action. It also shows that litigation is mostly deployed in
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conjunction with, rather than in the place of, political and other kinds of
non-legal action. In the articles that follow we provide examples to this
effect based on research conducted in four country contexts—Greece,
Italy, Romania, and Turkey.
Legal mobilization is not limited to litigation in courts or to recourse in
quasi-judicial bodies (i.e. equality bodies or agencies like the
Ombudsman). Indeed, it extends well beyond juridical activity to encom-
pass a wide variety of social and political mobilizations that take place “in
the shadow” of court decisions. As the country-based articles in this sym-
posium show, the norms that are pronounced in or inspired by ECtHR
judgments around religious freedom, education, or respect for private
and family life, are variably invoked by individual or collective actors
in the context of advocacy campaigns, public discourse, or grassroots
activism, to advocate, and legitimate but also to contest specific
demands. What is distinctive specifically about legal mobilization (as
opposed to other types of mobilization) is the authority and legitimacy
that one (individual, group, viewpoint) draws from appealing to law and
judicially pronounced rights to boost one’s claims. As it is noted,
“rights are a distinctly qualified political resource… When courts validate
an expansive interpretation [or rights]… they provide both institutional
leverage and discursive legitimation” (Scheingold 2004, 31).
In understanding how judicial decisions related to human rights can
influence the perceptions and discourses of the different social and reli-
gious actors, an analytically useful notion is that of framing. Framing
refers to the contentious processes in which meanings and ideas are
both debated and contested, but also negotiated and produced.9 Social
activists, including those engaging in disputes related to religious
freedom, extensively engaged in the construction of collective action
frames; namely, the construction of “action-oriented sets of beliefs and
meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a
social movement organisation” (Benford and Snow 2000, 614).
Framing takes place through contestation as individuals and groups are
called to navigate amidst contradictory “sets of ideas that help groups
explain, evaluate, and engage the social and political world”; the ideas
and frames that prevail may encourage or discourage legal advocacy,
rights claiming and resort to courts (Krishnan and Den Dulk 2002,
246). Being sufficiently flexible, inclusive and broad in interpretive
scope and cultural resonance, human rights can be seen as a “master
frame” in Europe but also globally.
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The field of religion-related mobilization in Europe comprises a highly
pluralistic array of actors with diverse views, priorities, and strategies,
who are relevant to this study. These include religious minority actors; reli-
gious majority actors; representatives of secular, atheist, religious, and
other ideological NGOs; “cause lawyers” representing religious freedom
cases; human rights organizations; and state representatives dealing with
issues related to religion and religious freedom. As demonstrated in the
articles that follow, many of these actors have variably been engaging in
“frame bridging” (Benford and Snow 2000, 624) in legal action before
the Strasbourg Court: they have been linking human rights norms related
to religion and religious freedom and conscience with a variety of claims
about education, morality, and ethics, anti-discrimination, or minority
culture, among others. Such diversification of religion-related claims in
the ECtHR suggests that one of the unintended and indirect effects of its
judgments has been to instill human rights discourse into a variety of
liberal and progressive, but also, at other times, conservative and reaction-
ary religion-related mobilization, in judicial and/or political arenas.
A judicial defeat may also allow social movement actors and litigators
to raise consciousness, to mobilize constituents and to dramatize social
injustices. It may trigger more aggressive organization, advocacy and
direct action on the part of the defeated party by highlighting more
intensely the injustice suffered by the group, and the courts’ ineffective-
ness in redeeming it (NeJaime 2011, 984). Court decisions can be
expected to become relevant in contexts of collective mobilization and
to contribute to rights awareness primarily among a pre-existing and orga-
nized constituency of activists, rather than in the society at large or among
isolated individuals (McCann 1994, 111).
If human rights can meaningfully and obviously be construed to
advance liberal, rights-expansive claims on behalf of disadvantaged
groups, such “bridging” is far less self-evident on behalf of conservative
religious actors and claims. Human rights are highly abstract, indetermi-
nate and thus contested principles. As it is noted more broadly, “just as
the indeterminacy of rights accommodates their egalitarian expansion,
so too can rights be inflected in anti-egalitarian ways” (Scheingold
2004, 33). This has been evidenced in religion-related struggles and
debates in North America but also more recently in Europe, as the research
showcased in this symposium demonstrates.
Religious conservatives in the United States have successfully mobi-
lized an anti-egalitarian politics of rights. They appropriated the language
of rights but they reframed their arguments to reflect an alternative
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understanding of equality itself—in the process constructing a “compet-
ing” myth of rights (Den Dulk 2006, 200; see also Fokas 2016). In
large part, religious conservatives and status quo actors in the United
States started to frame anti-egalitarian claims as rights in response to
Supreme Court decisions that expanded rights for minorities and upheld
abortion rights in the 1970s but also earlier. Liberal U.S. Supreme
Court decisions promoting pluralism and religious freedom heightened
concern among Catholics and Evangelicals with what they perceived as
the ascendancy of secular humanism and the moral decay of the broader
culture (Krishnan and Den Dulk 2002, 253; Hoover and Den Dulk
2004, 18). Overcoming their profound ambivalence about actively engag-
ing in political and social life, Evangelicals began to use the courts and the
language of rights in order to defend religious community values, and to
curtail liberal advancements (Den Dulk 2006). Against secular and egali-
tarian adversaries who supported the separation of religion from state and
the equal acceptance and recognition of all faiths, religious conservatives
argued that the value of equality demanded greater state accommodation
of religion in public life (Den Dulk 2006, 205). Thus, norms such as reli-
gious freedom and equality were appropriated to advance a conservative
agenda invoking morality and a religious way of life. Significantly, the
legal activism of Catholics and Evangelicals helped shape a highly
active movement and powerfully injected religion into U.S. politics.
ECtHR decisions and judgments can also contribute to the (trans)for-
mation of transnational networks around different issue areas. As we
saw in the case of Lautsi, but also in cases related to JWs, legal recourse
in the ECtHR often involves the mobilization and participation of a variety
of actors such as nationally-based JW organizations, organizations
working on religious freedom issues more broadly, public law organiza-
tions acting as third party interveners, and academic experts, among
others. ECtHR judgments may promote the creation of new or contribute
to the buttressing of formerly existing transnational advocacy networks.10
These are loosely or more densely associated non-governmental actors
motivated primarily by shared principled ideas and values employing
“strategies aimed to use information and beliefs to motivate political
action and to use leverage to gain the support of more powerful institu-
tions” (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 30). Transnational advocacy networks
are significant because they multiply the channels of access to the interna-
tional system and they also make international resources available to
new actors in domestic political and social struggles (Keck and Sikkink
1998, 1).
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RELIGION AND EDUCATION CASE LAW IN THE ECtHR: A
TAILORED APPROACH
The Strasbourg Court has radically changed the context for religious plu-
ralism in Europe (and beyond) through its handling of a large number of
issues which are central to the concerns of religious minorities and major-
ities, but also of many secularist and humanist groups. In its first water-
shed judgment of Kokkinakis v. Greece,11 related to religious freedom
in 1993, the ECtHR elaborated on the freedom of thought, conscience,
and religion (Article 9 ECHR) as one of the foundations of a “democratic
society”. Since then, the Court’s engagement with religion has grown
increasingly diverse and has entailed the application of Convention provi-
sions well beyond ECHR Article 9. Over time the case law has evolved
from addressing more “classic concerns” around religion stemming from
protection of or respect for majority religion through issues such as
church tax, blasphemy, and religious education, to an increasing trend
to include issues such as bioethics, limitations on religious symbols in
public spaces, social ethics, and religious dress in public spaces.
At the heart of the Strasbourg Court’s religion-related case law are what
Hunter-Henin describes as “tensions between a systemic approach, sensi-
tive to States” heritages and legal frameworks, and an individual approach,
more attuned to individual rights and beliefs” (Hunter-Henin 2012, 4).
The ultimate resolution of such tensions carries broad-ranging implica-
tions for religious and ideological majorities and minorities, whether
these are operating in overarching secularist environments or, alternatively,
in contexts with differing levels of established religion.12
We find such broad-ranging implications in the ECtHR case law specif-
ically on religion and education, impacting the rights of religious minori-
ties in relation to religious majorities; the rights of religious majorities in
relation to secular states; and the rights of atheists and secularists living in
contexts with established religion. In all four country cases included in this
symposium, various minority, secularist, and atheist actors have mobilized
and engaged in heated debates against majority religions over whether reli-
gion should be taught as part of school curricula. They have also contested
the content of religious classes, as well as whether and how national rules
can enable students from non-majority faiths and/or atheists to opt out of
religious education classes, but also out of sex education classes. How do
particular ECtHR judgments influence the opportunities and constraints
for such mobilization in different national contexts? Do institutional and
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civil society actors in domestic religion in education conflicts invoke
ECtHR case law to frame their views and claims?
The ECtHR’s rich repertoire of religion and education cases has in some
way (and sometimes in different ways over the years, thus reflecting the
Convention as a “living instrument’), addressed most of the current major
debates in the field across European countries. One of the earliest cases
in this field entailed exemption claims and, specifically, claims to exemp-
tion from sex education on the grounds of “offence to religious sensibili-
ties” (Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 1976).13 Here
the European Commission for Human Rights (hereby ECommHR)14
found that compulsory sex education in public schools does not violate
parental freedom. Ten years later, in Angeleni v. Sweden (1986), the
ECommHR declared inadmissible the claim of atheist parents that their
daughter should be exempted from the compulsory course in religion at
her state-run school, on the grounds that the student had not been subject
to any religious indoctrination.15 Similarly, in Bernard and Others v.
Luxembourg (1993), the ECommHR declared inadmissible a claim to the
right to exemption from the religious education course because the appli-
cants did not argue that the course in question entailed an exposure to
indoctrination and that the course, as taught, conflicted with their philo-
sophical beliefs.16 Notably, in Appel-Irrgang and Others v. Germany in
2009,17 the Court also declared inadmissible the case brought forward by
parents calling for an exemption from a mandatory ethics course because
they considered the instruction’s secular character contrary to their
Protestant belief.
One of the most definitive statements by the Court on the exemption,
but also on religious education in general, is that found in the case of
Folgero v. Norway (2007).18 In this case, we also see the intimate link
between the issue of exemption and that of the content and nature of
the religion courses. The claimants’ argument was that the Norwegian
public school course in Knowledge about Christianity, Religions and
Life Stance (KRL) was so heavily focused on the teaching of
Christianity that full exemption must be granted on the grounds of
Article 2 of ECHR Protocol 1. The Norwegian state contrarily claimed
that the course was non-confessional and knowledge-based, that the dis-
proportionate emphasis on Christianity was appropriate when taking into
account Norwegian history and culture, and that the partial exemption
scheme in place (allowing exemption from certain parts of the course
and certain “clearly religious activities’) sufficiently guaranteed the right
to education in accordance with parents’ religious or philosophical
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beliefs. In Folgero the Court engaged in a detailed assessment of the
content of the course and held that the curriculum of KRL gave prepon-
derant weight to Christianity by stating that the object of primary and
lower secondary education was to give pupils a Christian and moral
upbringing. The Court also found that the partial exemption scheme
entailed a heavy burden on the parents to remain informed of the details
of the course in order to know when the student ought to be exempted
and also risked undue exposure of their private life. It thus rendered the
mandatory teaching of the course, without the possibility of full exemp-
tion, in violation of the Convention.”
In Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey (2007)19 the claim was also about
the content of the religious culture and ethics courses. The Alevi parents
of a child argued that the course was taught in a way that praised the Sunni
interpretation of the Islamic faith and tradition without providing detailed
information about other faiths and was thus a violation of Article 2 of
Protocol 1. The claimant also alleged that the compulsory course in reli-
gious culture and ethics was incompatible with the principle of secularism.
The Court found that the syllabus could not be considered to meet the cri-
teria of objectivity and pluralism, nor to respect the religious and philo-
sophical convictions of the applicant, and that the exemption procedure
was inappropriate, and thus found in this case a breach of Article 2 of
the first Protocol. In 2014 the Court revisited the same issues, raised by
another follower of the Alevi faith, in Mansur Yalcin v. Turkey, again
finding a breach of Article 2, Protocol 1.20
In 2010 the Court contended with problems that may be faced by school
children who are exempted from religious education. Specifically, in
Grzelak v. Poland,21 the claimants argued that their son suffered from
the failure of the public school to organize alternative courses in ethics
during the time of the religious course, leaving him both inadequately
supervised during that period, and also without a mark in his school
report in the place of the religious course. The Court found in favor of
the claimants a violation of Article 9 in conjunction with Article 14
(anti-discrimination).
Another problem point in the area of religion and education found in
various country contexts and also addressed by the Court’s case law has
to do with mandatory participation in certain activities, whether religious
or patriotic. Here we find JWs leading in much of the related case law,
with cases opposing mandatory participation in school parades (Valsamis
v. Greece, 199622; Efstratiou v. Greece, 199623). In both cases, the Court
held that the applicants’ pacifist convictions could not have been offended
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by the parade, its purpose, or the arrangements for it and observed that pac-
ifist objectives and the public interest were served in such commemorations
of national events. The obligation to take part in the parade did not offend
the parents’ religious beliefs, and the penalty of suspension did not amount
to an interference with the students’ freedom of religion.
Also, well-embedded in the ECtHR’s repertoire are cases to do with reli-
gious symbols in public schools, mainly worn symbols but also, more
recently, those displayed. In Dahlab v. Switzerland (2001),24 the claim of
a primary-school teacher who had converted to Islam to the right to manifest
her faith through the wearing a headscarf while teaching was declared inad-
missible. The Court held that societies with multiple religions sometimes
had to limit religious freedom to “reconcile the interests of the various
groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected.” It also stated that
it was within the government’s discretion to prohibit the wearing of head-
scarves by public school teachers in order to balance these interests, and
that the importance of religious neutrality justified the restriction. In 2005,
again the Court restricted the right to manifest one’s religion through the
wearing of the headscarf, but this time of a university student, in Leyla
Sahin v. Turkey.25 Here then we have a pair of cases with a similar claim,
but one of a Muslim minority in a majority Christian context, and the
second of a Muslim majority member in a (then) secularist context.
(Notably, the same line of reasoning was maintained years later in Dogru
v. France26 and Kervanci v. France,27 both in 2008, with the Court uphold-
ing the state’s right to restrict thewearing of the headscarf in public schools).
With these cases, the Court opened itself up to criticism that it treats the
freedom to manifest Islam, whether in a majority Muslim or Christian
setting, as less than worthy of protection.28
The criticism of a differential approach grew with the case of Lautsi v.
Italy. More specifically, it grew with the Grand Chamber’s overturning,
in 2011, of the 2009 Chamber judgment which had found in favor of
the atheist parent’s claim that the display of the crucifix on public
school walls violated Article 2 of the first Protocol. Here the Court
ruled (amongst other things) that the crucifix was sufficiently neutral in
the particular context of the Italian school system as to not infringe
upon the right to education in accordance with one’s religious or philo-
sophical convictions. Lautsi then stands in stark contrast with the pro-
nouncements of non-neutrality of Islam-related symbols. It is also
worth noting that the Lautsi case is particularly prone to leave traces in
various national and local level settings because of its relatively wide
publicity across Europe.
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Finally, issues to do with religious autonomy in the educational arena
are also found in contemporary Europe as well as in the ECtHR case
law. An important precedent was set in Fernandez Martinez v. Spain,29
a case in which a priest who had married and in so doing broke Roman
Catholic celibacy vows was effectively dismissed (contract non-renewal)
from his post as a teacher of religious education in a public school after
having made public his status as a married priest. The Court ruled in
favor of the State in its respect of the Catholic Church’s autonomy in
choosing to not renew the teacher’s contract.
Such cases form the backdrop against which the four country case
studies presented in this symposium have been played out. As we shall
see in the four following contributions, whether and the extent to which
human rights law is mobilized in domestic conflicts varies within and
across the four countries under study, and so does the extent to which rel-
evant ECtHR judgments have been invoked by religious, secularist,
minority or atheist actors.
A RESEARCH AGENDA
The research presented in this symposium employs a bottom-up approach
that contextualizes court judgments within broader processes of religion-
related social mobilization. Its basic aim is to determine levels of religious,
political, legal and NGO awareness of, engagement with and uses of
ECtHR religion-related judgments. Such an approach includes attention
to the various ways that groups and individuals deploy legal resources—
i.e., ECtHR judgments and decisions, including the language of those
judgemnts and decisions and the reasoning therein—to wage their cam-
paigns in multiple venues including but also beyond courts. In order to
understand why and under what conditions ECtHR judgments can be
seized upon as resources to mobilize and empower social and religious
actors, we must unravel the local and national conditions and contexts
within which they are received and debated, and which may have important
similarities or differences across the four country cases. Qualitative in-
depth interview research with such actors yields critical insight into how,
why and under what conditions the Court’s religious freedom jurisprudence
impacts upon grassroots level mobilizations around religion, and upon reli-
gious pluralism as seen in action at the grassroots level.
The domain of religion and education is especially conducive to such a
study30. This topic allows for insights to be drawn on the secular v. the
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religious dimension of case law impact, because both religious and secu-
larist actors actively contribute to the relevant social and political debates.
The topic also allows examination of the minority v. majority dimension
in that religious majorities and religious minorities have vested interests
and actively engage in social and political struggles around both the teach-
ing of the majority religion in public schools (and rights to an exemption
for minority groups) and the rights to religious minority education in
accordance with their own faith. Finally, the subject area has expanded
so dramatically beyond the question of the teaching of religion, to
include sex education, same-sex education, participation in religious or
patriotic rituals, that—against the backdrop of a very rich collection of
related ECtHR case law—that a focus on religion and education “in the
shadow” of the ECtHR offers special insight into the potential influence
of the Court on religious pluralism on the ground in contemporary
societies.
In the articles to follow, evidence of the Court’s influence on the ground
is presented, alongside evidence of its lack of influence in several domains
and from one country context to another. The qualitative research pre-
sented therein offers a nuanced perspective both on the question, set out
above regarding what kind of inspiration, awareness, and motivation an
ECtHR judgment can provide to domestic actors pursuing a secular and
pluralist kind of teaching of and about religion in school, and on the ques-
tion of how an ECtHR judgment may be demobilizing for social actors.
Take, for example, the case of Lautsi v. Italy: Lautsi’s reverberations
were powerful both across the four countries studied as well as across
issue areas, so that it encouraged majority actors seeking to preserve the
status quo, and operated as a demobilizing factor for secularist actors in
fields well beyond that of religion and education. In Italy for example,
many social actors consulted for the study interpreted the judgment as
an indication that the Concordat between the Italian state and the
Roman Catholic Church trumps most else, and no challenges to reli-
gion-state relations (and to majority religion privileges) would be
upheld by the ECtHR. Meanwhile, the same categories of respondents
in Romania read in the Lautsi verdict a blow to any minority religious
claims.
Besides demobilization, we are also presented in the texts that follow
with stark examples of counter-mobilization, as in the Romanian case of
a religious activist complaining: “it was a rather brutal entry in this
domain…They [the secularists] kept saying that they would take the
case to the ECtHR … After which we started being interested in what
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the ECtHR is, how the ECtHR mechanism works” and thus began prepar-
ing for a potential intervention before the Court on the topic at hand.
The texts that follow also provide insight into the powerful role played
by judicial defeat. As noted above, a judicial defeat may also allow social
movement actors and litigators to raise consciousness, to mobilize constit-
uents and to dramatize social injustices. Of the countries studied in the
present collection of articles, nowhere is this dynamic more conspicuous
than in the Turkish case, where national judicial defeats have so pointedly
mobilized groups to litigate before the ECtHR. And in the aftermath of
such ECtHR case law, the Turkish state’s failure to implement the deci-
sions has buttressed the development of far more developed networks of
actors raising consciousness, mobilizing constituents and dramatizing
the injustices in the domain of religion and education.
As will become clear through the following articles, much is contingent
on the national legal-political context in which religious actors operate.
Again, relations between religion and the state are shaped by deeply
ingrained and highly diverse traditions across countries, by varying
degrees of tolerance for minority faiths; and by place of religion in
public life. We see echoes of each of these factors in the voices of grass-
roots level actors presented in the four country case studies: the potential
role of the ECtHR in each context is often seen through the prism of reli-
gion-state relations in each country context, and higher levels of awareness
of the “margin of appreciation” leads to lower expectations of changes to
the status quo on matters touching on religion-state relations.
Further, as evinced in the research presented as a whole in this sympo-
sium, the normative pronouncements contained in ECtHR judgments and
decisions are only one among a broader universe of normative principles,
with which they may cohere, compete or come into conflict, and which
can be invoked in collective mobilization and public discourse.
Alternative sources of norms around religious freedom include the
national constitution, EU law, national courts and human rights agencies
and quasi-judicial bodies (such as the office of the Ombudsman). The
latter point serves as a loud cry for the need for empirical, grassroots
level understanding of the Court’s potential impact, as the radiating
effects of the case law will necessarily vary depending on what those alter-
native sources of norms around religious freedom are in different contexts.
Only through comparative study may begin to understand the factors
encouraging or inhibiting the transformative potential of Court’s pro-
nouncements on religion and education on the ground.
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NOTES
This article is written in the context of the Grassrootsmobilise Research Programme (http://www.
grassrootsmobilise.eu), funded by the European Research Council (ERC, Grant no. 338463). We
acknowledge our thanks to the ERC, as well as to the London School of Economics Hellenic
Observatory for the support to Effie Fokas during this research. We would also like to thank the jour-
nal’s anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback. Please see also the working paper on this topic
(Anagnostou and Fokas 2015) for the analytical frame which served as a guide to our research in the
Grassrootsmobilise research programme.
1. ‘Religious field’ is interpreted broadly to include issues that directly implicate faith groups
(whether majority or minority) but also issues which relate to deeply-held beliefs and concerns of reli-
gious, non-religious, secular and/or secularist, atheist, and humanist groups; the issues may have no
direct link to religion per se but may lie more in the realm of social ethics (e.g., same-sex marriage).
2. The ECtHR is not formally a constitutional court, but an international tribunal. However, in its
evolution over time, the Strasbourg Court has increasingly performed a role that closely resembles that
of constitutional courts. This evolution is reflected in scholarship on the Court presenting it as ‘largely,
though not fully constitutional’; see Sadurski (2009), 448–449.
3. Partial exceptions include the work of Cichowski (2007; 2013), Richardson and Lee (2014), and
Van den Eynde (2013), while the work of Fokas (2015; 2016) is more focused specifically on the indi-
rect effects of ECtHR case law, in the domain of religion. Meanwhile, Michael Goldhaber’s A People’s
History of the European Court of Human Rights (2009) explores indirectly the mobilizing potential of
that court’s case law.
4. Also critical here is the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court is a national court while the ECtHR is
an international court, a difference which carries significant implications for potential public legiti-
macy. See Alter, Helfer and Madsen 2016; see also Fokas (2017a)
5. ‘Religion’ is notoriously difficult to define. In the present paper, the word is used very loosely to
refer also to conscience or belief (as the three notions are presented together in Article 9 of the ECHR).
6. See Fokas (2015) for further development of this argument in relation to the Grassrootsmobilise
research programme (http://www.grassrootsmobilise.eu).
7. Here a nuanced perspective is required: while the JW case law did not result in a change to the
legal framework, for example, banning proselytism (which was behind the watershed Kokkinakis case),
it did lead to a change in policies in terms of how administrative and judicial authorities applied the
relevant provisions. See Fokas (2017b); see also Fokas forthcoming.
8. See also the debate with Rosenberg, in Rosenberg (1992).
9. For an overview of a sizeable social movement scholarship on framing, see Benford and Snow
(2000).
10. For more on third party interventions and transnational networks around the ECtHR, see Fokas
(2016).
11. ECtHR, Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14308/88, May 25, 1993.
12. Establishment of religion entails state official recognition and support of a particular religious
institution as a national institution.
13. ECtHR, Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, App. Nos. 5095/71; 5920/72; 5926/
72, December 7, 1976.
14. Between 1959 and 1992, cases related to the right to religious freedom were dealt with exclu-
sively by the European Commission of Human Rights and not by the Court. In 1998, the introduction
of Protocol 11 abolished the two-tiered system and the European Commission of Human Rights filter-
ing, establishing a single Court.
15. ECommHR, Angeleni v. Sweden, App. No. 10491/83, December 3, 1986.
16. ECommHR, Bernard and Others v. Luxembourg, App. No. 17187/90, September 8, 1993.
17. ECtHR, Appel-Irrgang and Others v. Germany, App. No. 45216/07, October 6, 2009.
18. ECtHR, Folgero v. Norway, App. No. 15472/02, June 29, 2007.
19. ECtHR, Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey, App. No. 1448/04, October 9, 2007.
20. ECtHR, Mansur Yalçin and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 21163/11, September16, 2014.
21. ECtHR, Grzelak v. Poland, App. No. 7710/02, November 22, 2010.
22. ECtHR, Valsamis v. Greece, App. No. 21787/93, December 18, 1996.
23. ECtHR, Efstratiou v. Greece, App. No. 24095/94, December 18, 1996.
24. ECtHR, Dahlab v. Switzerland, App. No. 42393/98, February 15, 2001.
The “Radiating Effects” of the ECtHR on Social Mobilizations S27
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048318000445
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 86.158.67.61, on 25 Mar 2019 at 11:47:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
25. ECtHR, Leyla S¸ahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, November 10, 2005.
26. ECtHR, Dogru v. France, App. No. 27058/05, December 4, 2008.
27. ECtHR, Kervanci v. France, App. No. 31645/04, December 4,2008.
28. For an excellent analysis of Islam related cases and discussion of discrepancies between the
Court’s handling of Christianity and Islam, see Durham et al. (2012).
29. ECtHR, Fernández Martínez v. Spain, App. No. 56030/07, June 12, 2014.
30. For information about other domains studied in the [xxx] project, see [withheld for blind
review].
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